University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

8-25-1964

A-1 Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guarantee Sav.
& Loan Ass'n
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, A-1 Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guarantee Sav. & Loan Ass'n 61 Cal.2d 728 (1964).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/304

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

[So F. No. 21372.

In Bank.

Aug. 25, 1964.]

A~lDOORAND

MATERIALS COMPANY, Plaintift, Crossdefendant and Respondent, v. FRESNO GUARANTEE
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant, Crosscomplainant and Appellant; M. KELLNER & SON
LUMBER COMPANY et a!., Cross-defendants and Respondents; BENJAMIN LEVITT et at, Cross-defendants
and Appellants.

[la,lb] Liens-Equitable Lieu.-In a declaratory relief action to
determine the rights of unpaid materialmen to the proceeds of
eonstrnction loans held by defendant, there was no support
for a determination that mechanic's lien claimants were entitled to equitable liens on the loan funds where there was no
evidence of any reliance on the loan funds or any inaucement
so to rely, and no evidence from which reliance could reasonably be inferred.
[2] ld.-Equitable Lieu.-An equitable lien may be imposed on
a constrnction-loan fund only if it is established that the
borrower or lender induced the supplier of labor or materials
to rely on the fund for payment.
[3] Mecbanics'Liens-Stop Notice-E1rect of Failure to File
Mechanic's Lien.-That stop-notice claimants of the proceeds
of constrnction loans failed to file mechanic's lien claims did
not foreclose them from the right to recover on their stopnotice claims, since. such a claim does not depend on establishment of a lien. The remedies are independent and cumulative.
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Liens, §§ 10,11; Am.Jur., Liens (1st ed § 18).
I3] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Mechanic's Liens, § 54.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Liens, § 8; [3] Mechanics' Liens,
fi77; [4) Mechanics' Liens, §82(1); [5) Mechanics' Liens, f81;
[6, 7] Mechanics' Liens, § 233; [8] Mechanics' Liens, § 75.
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(4] Id.-Stop lfotice-Efl'ect of lfotice-As Equitable (lanlishment.-Although Code Civ. Proe., § 1190.1, subd. (h), relating
to stop-notice procedure by a mechanic or materialman, refers
to stop-notice claims as effecting an equitable garnishment, the
use of such term does not imply that stop-notice claimants'
right to recover depended on the owners' rights under a loan
agreement with the construction-loan fundholder; tbe fundholder's obligation under the statute to withhold claimed funds
applies not only when his contract cans for payment but even
when it does not, and, in addition, subd. (h) provides that no
assignment by thil· owner of construction .loan funds, whether
made before or after a verified claim is filed, shall be held to
take priority over claims filed under such subdivision, and such
assignment shan have no binding force insofar as the rights
of claimants who file claims thereunder are concerned.
[6] Id.-Stop lfotice-Efl'ect of Prior Assignment.-A construction of Code Civ.Proc.,§ 1190.1, subd. (h), relating to stopnotice procedure by a mechanic or materialman, that invalidates an owner's assignment of a construction fund hack to
the lender with a progress payment agreement is not an unconstitutional infringement of the fundholder's right to contract;
it is a legitimate legislative purpose to give suppliers of
materials and labor reasonable assurance that thilY will be
compensated, and subordinating the claims of assignees of
construction-loan funds to those of stop-notice claimants is a
reasonable way to accomplish that purpose.
[6] Id.-Judgment-Interest.-Wbere a construction-loan fundholder withheld· funds until stop-notice claimants had established their claims, not in breach of its obligations, but in
compliance wit)! the requirements of both Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1190.1, subd. (h), relating to stop-notice procedure by a
mechanic or materialman, and Code Civ. Proe., § 1197.1, relating to the time for commencing an action to enforce payment
of any stop-notice claim, such fundholder was not personally
liable for interest before judgment and its liability for stopnotice claims was limited to the amount of the fund against
which the claims were asserted. ""'"
[7] Id.-Judgment-Interest.-Although a construction-loan fundholder was not personally liable for prejudgment interest on
stop-notice claims, it was liable to the extent that constructionloan fbnds were available for whatever the owners owed the
stop-notice claimants, including prejudgnlent interest properly
chargeable to the ownell.
[8] Id.-Stop lfotice-Computation of Amount Withheld. - An
award of prejudgment interest to stop-notice claimants which
is properly chargeable agninst the owners does not create an
unreasonable uncertainty for construction-loan fundholders as
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to how much of the loan funds must be withheld when bonded
stop notices are filed, since, by examining the bond accompanying the notice, which must be in the amount of one and
one quarter times the amount of the claim, the fundholder can
determine that it must withhold 80 per cent of the amount
of the bond.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Fresno County. Edward L. Kellas, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part with directions.
Action against maker of a construction loan to recover
amount claimed from loan fund by a bonded stop notice; and
cross-action by defendant for a declaration of rights of all
unpaid materialmen. Judgment declaring that stop-notice
claimants had prior equitable liens on the loan fund and that
mechanic's lien claimants and lender had subordinate equitable
liens and holding defendant personally liable for interest before judgment, reversed as to mechanic's lien claimants, reversed with directions as to personal liability of defendant
lender for interest before jUdgment, and in all other respects
affirmed.
Docker, Docker, Perkins & Shelton, John M. Shelton and
Frederick W. Docker for Defendant, Cross-complainant and
Appellant.
McKenna & Fitting, Norman H. Raiden, James C. Peterson,
Morrison, Foerster, Holloway, Clinton & Clark, Douglas C.
White, Landels, Ripley, Gregory & Diamond and Edward D.
Landels as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Doty, Quinlan & Kershaw, Burke & La Rue and William A.
Quinlan for Cross-defendants and Appellants.
Clifford R. Lewis for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent.

•

Hynes, Bowser & Brunn and McKnight Brunn as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent.
Meux, Gallagher, Baker & Manock, Kendall L. Manock and
Ralph Moradian for Cross-defendants and Respondents.
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TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant and certain cross-<'lefendants
appeal from a judgment for plaintiff and cross-defendants
determining the rights of unpaid matE'rialmen to the proceeds of construction loans held by defendant savings and loan
association.
The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts. Defendant entered into three construction-loan agreements with
the owners of three parcels of unimproved real property. Each
loan was secured by a deed of trust on the parcel of property
to which the loan was to be applied. The owners assigned the
loan funds to defendant, and defendant agreed to disburse
them in five equal progress payments, the last payment to
be due on the completion of each project. Construction of
the buildings was not completed, and no further work was
done after the fourth progress payment. Defendant retained
the unexpended funds. Plaintiff and three other unpaid
materialmen (hereinafter called stop-notice claimants) filed
bonded stop notices with defendant pursuant to section 1190.1,
subsection (h) of the Code of Civil Procedure.! Several other
materialmen (hereinafter called mechanic's lien claimants),
who did not file stop notices, filed mechanic's lien claims.
Plaintiff brought this action to enforce its claim, and defendant cross-complained for a declaration of the rights of all
parties interested in the disposition of the loan funds. All
of the cross-defendants who answered claimed a right to the
loan funds, the stop-notice claimants on the basis of their
notices and the mechanic's lien claimants on the ground that
having recorded mecl1anic's liens, they had equitable liens on
lSection 1190.1, subsection (h) provides that any supplier of labor or
materials except the general contractor "in any instance in which the
funds with which the cost of the work of improvements are, wholly or in
part, to be defrayed from the proceeds of a building loan, [may] give
to ••• [any] party holding any funds furnished or to be furnished by the
owner or lender or any other person as a fund from which to pay construction costs or arising out of a construction or building loan, a notice"
that he has supplied labor materials of a specified value to the owner.
If a bond of a specified amount is filed with the notil'e of claim, the
person given the notiee "must withhold from the borrower or other
person to whom· said owner may be obligated to make payments or
advancements out of said fund sufficient money to answer such claim..••
No assignment by the owner ••• of construction loan funds, whether
made before [or after] a verified claim is filed . . • shall be held to take
priority over claims filed under this subsection (h) and such assignment
shall have no binding force insofar as the rights of claimants who file
claims hereunder are concerned.' ,
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the funds. Defendant admitted that the claimants had not
been paid and stipulated to tIle amounts of their claims, but
contended that it had a right to apply the undisbursed funds
to reduce the owners' debt to it or to complete the buildings.
The trial court held that the stop-notice claimants were
entitled to recover from defendant on their claims; that those
claims were of equal priority and bad priority over all other
claims; and that the mechanic's lien claimants had· equitable
liens on the loan funds of equal priority with the defendant's
claim that it had a right to use the funds to complete the
buildings. The trial court allowed interest on all claims
and held it to be a personal liability of defendant.
[1a] We agree with defendant that the evidence does not
support the finding that the mechanic's lien claimants were
entitled to equitable liens on the loan funds. [2] An equitable lien may be imposed on a construction-loan fund only if
it is established that the borrower or lender induced the
supplier of labor or materials to rely on the fund for payment.
(Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 501-504
[271 P. 898] ; Pacific Bead'll 'Cut Homes, Inc. v. Title Ins. ct
Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447,450-452 [14 P.2d 510].) [1b] There
is no evidence in the record of any reliance on the loan funds
or of any inducement so to rely. Nor is there any evidence
from which reliance may reasonably be inferred. (Compare
Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., supra, at pp. 502-503.)
Invoking Hayward Lbr. ct In11. Co. v. Coast etc. Assn., 47
Cal.App.2d 211 [117 P.2d 682], the mechanic's lien claimants contend that they established their right to an equitable
lien merely by filing mechanic's lien claims. That case did
not so decide. The fundholder there conceded the claimants'
right to the fund, and the only issue litigated was whether it
was necessary to file suit to perfect the claims.
[3] The mechanic's lien claimants contend that the tria]
court erred in upholding the claims of two stop-notice claimants because they did not file mechanic's lien claims. The
right to recover on a stop-notice claim, however, "does not
depend ltpon the establishment of a lien." (Diamond Match
Co. v. S'iZberstein, 165 Cal. 282, 288 [131 P. 874].) The
remedies are independenti and cumulative. CIa. at pp. 288289; CaZhoun v. Huntington Park First Sa11. ct Loan Assn.,
186 Cal.App.2d 451,459 [9 Cal.Rptr. 479], and cases cited.)
[4] Defendant contends that the stop-notice claims should
not baye been allowed because section 1190.1, subsection (b)
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provides for an equitable garnishment of construction.loan
funds. An effective legal garnishment depends on there being
an existing debt owed by the garnishee to the debtor. De.
fendant owes the owners nothing, however, because of their
default. In defendant's view there is therefore nothing to
garnish.
Section 1190.1, subsection (h) does refer to the stop·notice
claims as effecting an equitable garnishment. As defendant
points out, this term undoubtedly was derived from a series
of cases interpreting the stop·notice provisions of the me·
chanic's lien law enacted in 1885 (Stats. 1885, Cll. 152, p.
143) and amended or repealed in 1911 (Stats. 1911, ch. 681,
p. 1313.) The term "equitable garnishment" was used inter·
changeably with "equitable assignment," .. equitable lien,"
and "equitable subrogation" (see, e.g., Bates v. Oounty of
Santa Barbara, 90 Cal. 543, 546-547 [27 P. 438]; Weldon y.
Superior Oourt, 138 Cal. 427, 429-430 [71 P. 502] ; Butler v.
NO Ohung, 160 Cal. 435, 439 [117 P. 512, Ann.Cas. 1913A
940] ; Diamond Match 00. v. Silberstein, 165 Cal. 282, 288
[131 P. 874] ; Stettin v. Wilson, 175 Cal. 423,426 [166 P. 6])
to describe the effect of stop-notice claims on funds held by
owners. Under the statutory provisions in effect at that time
the personal liability of the owner to stop-notice claimants was
limited, as it presently is under section 1190.1, subsection
(c), to the amount "due or that may become due" to the
owner's contractor. It was suggested in dicta in several of
the foregoing cases that the claimants' rights against tIle owner
were tIlerefore limited to the contractor's rights under his
contract. This position would be consistent with the use of the
terms "garnishment," "assignment," or "subrogation" in
their usual senses. Nevertheless, in the most recent case decided by this court in which the issue was considered, Stettin
v. Wilson, 175 Cal 423, 426 [166 P. 6], it was held that the
terms of the owner's contract with his contractor, which would
have barred any recovery by the contractor because he had
abandoned his contract, did not preclude recovery from the
owner by st.()p-notice claimants. That there was no money due
under the contract was held not to be determinative of the
issue. (See also O. OmwT!l; Lbr. 00. v. Weinsve1'g, 168 Cal.
664,668.670 [143 P. 10.25] ; Diamond :Mafch 00. v. St'lberstein,
165 Cal. 282, 286-288 [131 P. 874] ; Hampton v. Christensen,
·148 Cal. 729, 737-739 [84 P. 200].) Thus the use of the
term" equitablc gnrnisllme>nt" does not imply that the stop.
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notice claimants' right to recover depends on the owners'
rights under their contract with defendant. Nor does the use
of the word "withhold" in subsection (h) imply that tIle
monies withheld must be due the owner. The fact that the
fundholder may be under no compUlsion to pay does not
mean that he ~ay not voluntarily disburse the funds. The
requirement that the fundholder withhold claimed funds applies not only when his contract calls for payment but even
when it does not.
Subsection (h) requires that upon receipt of a bonded stopnotice claim the fundholder ., must withhold from the borrower or other person to whom said owner may be obligated
to make payments or advancements out of said fund sufficient
money to answer such claim." The subsection does not require the fund110lder to withhold only so much of the fund as
may be due under its contract with thc owner. On the contrary the "said fund'" from which a lcnder must withhold
claimed money is defined in the first paragraph of subsection
(h) as that amount "furnislled or to be furnished by the . . .
lender . . . as a fund from which to pay construction costs,"
or that amount "arising out of a construction or building
loan." The fundholder must therefore withhold from funds
furnished to pay construction costs or arising out of a construction loan sufficient money to answer bonded stop-notice
claims regardless of the terms of its contract with the owner.
If the terms of that contract determined the rights of the
claimants under subsection (h), the parties to the contract
could effectively eliminate those rigllts. They might, for example, condition the lender's obligation to pay on there being
no stop notices filed. Subsection (h) requires that funds
earmarked for construction purposes be used· to pay suppliers
of labor and materials who file claims under the subsection
and therefore supersedes the private arrangements of borrower and lender.
Furthermore, defendant's claim to tIle funds in this case
is incompatible with the final sentence of subsection (h):
"No assignment by the owner . . . of construction loan funds,
whether made before [or after] a verified claim is filed ..•
shall be held to take priority over claims filed under this
subsectton (11) and such assignment sllaH have no binding
force insofar as the rights of claimants W]lO fi](' claims hereunder are concerned." The arrangem('nt brtween tIle oWIl('rs
and,def(,lIdant is directly controlled by this provision. De-
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fendant lent specified amounts to the owners for construction purposes, and the owners executed promissory notes for,
and agreed to pay interest on, the full amount of each loan.
Such a fund as is contemplated by subsection (h) was therefore created. The owners assigned the funds to defendant as
security for their obligation to repay the loans and for any
of their other obligations to defendant.1 Defendant agreed
to disburse the funds according to a progress payment schedule. Thus defendant's possession of the funds and its defense to the stop-notice claims based on its asserted right to
continued possession of the funds depend entirely on assignments invalidated by the terms of subsection (h).
Defendant contends that allowing the claims herein will
result in forcing it to violate state statutes governing the lending practices of savings and loan associations. These statutes
limit the amount of construction loans to a specified percentage of the projected appraised value of the property to be
improved. (Fin. Code, §§ 7152-7154, 7156.) There is no
showing in this case, howenr, that the loans exceeded the
permitted percentage. It is therefore unnecessary to consider
the issue.
[6] There is no merit in defendant's contention that a
construction of section 1190.1, subsection (h) that invalidates
the assignment is an unconstitutional infringement of its right
to contract. It is a legitimate legislative purpose to give suppliers of materials and labor reasonable assurance that they
will be compensated. (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 15; Boystone
CO. V. Darling, 171 Cal. 526, 540 [154 P. 15]), and subordinating the claims of assignees of construction-loan funds to
those of stop-notice claimants is a reasonable way to accomplish that purpose. Furthermore a lender such as defendant
can make loan funds immune from claims under section
1190.1, subsection (h) by furnishing a materials and labor
bond complying with the requirements of section 1185.1.of the
Code of Civil Procedure. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1190.1, subsec. (j).)
[6] Defendant correctly contends that the trial court
erred in hQlding it personally liable for interest before judgment. Stop-notice claims to one of the three funds, the fund
allocated to Parcell, exceeded
the amount in that fund. The
1
IDefendant alao was civen tint deeds of trust on the property to be
improved as 8ecuritJr for the loanB.
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trial court prorated the claims 80 that their total equaled
the amount of that fund and allowed interest before judgment
on the claims as adjusted. Defendant was thus held liable
for an amount in excess of that fund. The stop-notice claimants concede that defendant complied with the provisions of
section 1190.1, subsection (h) by withholding the funds from
the owners, but contend that section 1190.1, subsection (h)
impliedly requires the fundholder to pay tIle claims, pro rata
if necessary, as soon as their total has been ascertained.
A failure to pay at tllat time, they contend, is a breach of
the fundholder's obligation resUlting in its being personally
liable for interest on the claims from the date the fundholder's obligation to pay arose.
The claimants' right to payment, however,arises not simply
upon their giving notice of their claims, but upon compliance
with section 1197.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Subsection (a) of that section provides, "No action to enforce
the payment of any claim, notice of which may be given
pursuant to article 2 [Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1190.1-1192.2],
shall be commenced against the ownerl8] • . .prior to the
expiration of the period within which claims of lien must
be filed for record, as prescribed by section 1193.1 of this
code, nor shall any such suit be commenced later than 90
days following the expiration of such period. No money . . .
shall be withheld by reason of any such notice as is prescribed
by article 2 longer than said 90 days . . • unless proceedings
be commenced in a proper court within that time by the
claimant to enforce his claim; and . . . upon the termination of said 90 days above provided if such proceedings have
not been commenced, such notice shall cease to be effective
and the moneys . . . withheld shall be paid or delivered to
the . . . person to whom they are due." Subsections (c)
and (d) provide for the joinder of parties, for the consolidation of actions, and for impleading all claimants to withheld
funds "to the end that the respective rights of all parties
may be adjudicated and settled" in one action. Defendant's
withholding the funds until the claimants established their
'Because of his interest in the loan funds, the owner i8 a neeeesary
party to a proceeding to enforce a claim, notice of which is given under
8ection 1190.1, subsection (h)(sce Gregg v. Stark, 128 Cal.App. 434,
436-437 [17 P.2d 766]; Neal v. Bqn'k of America, 93 Cal.App.2d 678,
681 [209 P.2d 825]), and is a necessary party to a complete settlement
of the entire controversy. (See Bank of CalifOf'1l,ia v. Superior Court, 16
Cal.2d 516, 523 [106 P.2d 879].)
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claims was therefore not in breach of its obligations but in
compliance with the requirements of both section 1190.1,
subsection (h) and section 1197.1. Defendant's liability for
stop-notice claims is therefore limited to the amount of the
fund against which the claims are asserted.
[7] There is no merit, however, in defendant's contention that if a fundholder complies with section 1190.1, subsection (h) no interest before judgment can ever be allowed.
Defendant concedes that interest before judgment would
properly be chargeable to the owners in this case. .As stated
in Oalhoun v. Huntington Park First Sav. & Loan Assn.,
186 Cal.App.2d 451, 462 [9 Cal.Rptr. 479], "The 'equitable
garnishment' effected through stop notice proceedings, like
the mechanic's lien, 'is as extensive as the claim which it is
intended to protect.' (Pacific Mutual Life Ins. 00. v. Fisher,
106 Cal. 224, 233, 234 [39 P. 758].)" (See Diamond Match
Co. v. Silberstein, 165 Cal. 282, 288-289 [131 P. 874].) To
the extent that construction-loan funds are available, therefore, the fundllOlder must pay whatever the owners owe the
stop-notice claimants.
[8] Nor is there any merit in defendant's contention that
awarding interest before judgment will create unreasonable
uncertainty for fundholders as to how much of the loan funds
must be withheld when bonded stop notices are filed. The
fundholder must withhold the amount claimed in the stop
notice, and any doubts about how much to withhold can be
resolved by examining the bond accompanying the notice.
To compel the withholding of funds the claimant must file
It bond in the amount of one and one quarter times the amount
of the claim. The amount that must be withheld is therefore eighty per cent of the amount of the bond.
The trial court's decision does not, as defendant contends,
create uncertainty about the date from which to compute
interest. The court awarded interest to two of the claimants
from the date the owners' obligation became due, which was
correct (Civ. Code, § 3287), and to the other claimants from
the date that their notices were filed. Since the latter claimants asked for interest from the date the notices were filed
and did not allege or prove that the obligations were due at
an earlier date, the cou~ 's award to them was also correct.
The judgment for the mechanic's lien claimants is reversed.
To the extent that defendant was held personally liable for
interest before judgment, the judgment is reversed with direc11 c.a.s--.I
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tions to the trial court to recompute thc claims to the fund
allocated to Parcel 1 .80 that the total of the prorated claims
including interest equals the amount of that fund. In all
other respects the judgment is affirmed. Defendant and the
stop-notice claimants shall recover their costs on the appeal
of the mechanic's lien claimants. Defendant shall recover
its costs on its appeal from the judgment in favor of the
mechanic's lien claimants. The stop-notice claimants and
defendant shall bear their own costs on defendant's appeal
from the judgment in favor of the stop-notice claimants.
Gibson, O. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner,
J., and Peek, J., concurred.
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